Ambidextrous organizations are supposed to innovate successfully both in case of evolutionary and revolutionary change through managing multiple and contradicting organizational architectures. This paper extends the theory on ambidextrous organizations through an explorative double case study of the structural and cultural aspects of successful incremental and radical innovations in one organization. Empirical data and theory are compared iteratively to define and elaborate the key concepts and patterns. We discuss four main findings on the management of the 'hardware', the structure, and 'software', the culture, of the ambidextrous organization.
INTRODUCTION
Ambidextrous organizations innovate successfully both in case of evolutionary and revolutionary change (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996) . However, putting together in one organization the required characteristics of structure and culture for both types of change is a challenging task, because they are the elements of contradictory organizational architectures (Tushman et al., 1997) . Researchers have investigated the structure and culture of organizations which excel in incremental change (Burgelman, 1994; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996; Chakravarthy, 1997; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000) and of organizations which outperform competitors in radical change (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000 , Cockburn et al. 2000 , Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000 Langlois and Steinmueller, 2000) . Incremental change occurs in centralized structures with highly standardized processes (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) . Semi-structures, sequential steps through experimentation and links in time encourage continuous incremental change in high-velocity markets (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) . Radical innovation must be performed in a separate unit, which is not burdened by the path dependencies of old structures and ways of doing things, and must be later integrated to replace the obsolete traditional businesses (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Christensen and Overdorf, 2000; Gilbert and Christensen, 2002) . This paper extends the theory on ambidextrous organizations through an explorative double case study of the structural and cultural aspects of simultaneous incremental and radical innovation in one organization. We compare the interventions in structure and culture introduced by the managers of IBM in two projects defined by them as a project of an incremental innovation and a project of a radical innovation. The qualitative data of semi-structured interviews, observations and document analysis is complemented by quantitative data from structured interviews with 50 members of the organization. Empirical data and theory are compared iteratively to define and refine the key concepts and patterns.
We discuss four main findings on the management of the 'hardware', structure, and 'software', culture, of ambidextrous organization. First, the definition of incremental and radical innovation in the two cases refers only to the type of change of products and not to type of required change of the processes, and determines the managerial approach to innovation. Second, the project on incremental innovation did not follow the espoused logic of experimenting and 'managing the present'. It differed from radical innovation alongside different dimensions. Third, the radical innovation did occur in a structure, which was formally separated from the organization, but the new unit maintained the old organizational culture. Forth, the reintegration of the new business unit in the old structure did introduce individuals with new skills in the old structure, but seemed to simultaneously destroy both new and old organizational capabilities and to lead to the need of further investment in capability building.
The remaining part of the paper is structured in four sections. In section 1, we present a literature review on management of innovation and change management. Then, in section 2, we discuss the setting, the choice of research method and the data collection and analysis procedures.
The next section presents the key findings and the supporting data. Finally, we discuss the contributions of the new findings to the extant theories on management of change and innovation.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Researchers often investigate innovation in separate research programs. If we put them together, we observe that while small and medium sized firms seem to be succeed in both incremental and radical change, large firm do not and therefore seem to be less able to be 'ambidextrous'. In this section we offer the evidence on the problems of large organizations to be ambidextrous and, then, we discuss the insights from different streams on innovation and change related to how firms manage streams of innovation.
Technological change has proven particularly difficult to cope with for established firms, which need to reconfigure complex inertial organizations to cope successfully with both incremental and radical innovation and maintain their position of competitive advantage. In the case of incremental innovations, the incumbents usually succeed in maintaining their leadership position (Christenen, 1997; Tripsas, 1997; Utterback, 1994) . There are numerous examples of established firms failing in the face of radical technological change (Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Majumadar, 1982; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Utterback, 1994; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996; Christensen, 1997) . Various research streams have explored this phenomenon. Firms struggle with radical innovation because (a) they fail to invest; (b) they invest, but in the wrong capabilities; and/or because (c) their dominant logic hinders them to invest.
Firms may loose their leadership position because they fail to invest in radical innovation.
Often new entrants have greater strategic incentives to invest in radical innovation (Gilbert and Newbury, 1982; Reinganum, 1983; Henderson, 1993) . Incumbents may be reluctant to invest, for example, for fear of cannibalising existing businesses. Research suggests that whether incumbents or new entrants are likely to fare well is a function of the type of innovation; whether incumbents or new entrants are able to introduce and exploit innovation depends on whether the innovation is incremental or radical (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Tirole, 1988) . Furthers studies have shown that 'architectural' changes in design will be problematic for established leaders (Henderson and Clark, 1990) . Moreover, existing market power and the uncertainty surrounding the innovative process influences the incentive to invest in innovation (Gilbert and Newbery, 1984; Reinaganum, 1984; Salant, 1984; Bresnahan, 1985) .
Firms that invest may still fail. The successful introduction and development of an innovation also depends on the impact of the innovation on organizational capabilities of the firm. Incremental innovation reinforces the capabilities of established organizations, while radical innovation forces them to ask a new set of questions, to draw on new technical and commercial skills, and to employ new problem-solving approaches (Burn and Stalker, 1966; Ettlie, Bridges, and O'Keefe, 1984) . If the innovation is incremental, incumbents are likely to continue to dominate since they have already the capabilities which new entrants have to build from scratch (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Banbury and Mitchell, 1995) . Such competence-enhancing innovation depends often on non-technological assets that influence the direction of the firm's technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982) . The firm can utilize existing complementary assets -assets essential for the commercialisation of the technology (Teece, 1986; Helfat, 1997) . For instance, a firm's existing marketing capabilities makes it more likely to develop products that take advantage of the knowledge and relationships with the existing customer base as opposed to a new customer segment (Christensen, 1997) .
Incumbents that invest lose their leadership in the face of radical innovations when they are competence-destroying to them; they are less efficient in introducing and exploiting these innovations than new entrants (Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Foster, 1986) . When learning needs to be distant and radically new capabilities need to be developed, core competencies often become 'core rigidities' and firms fall into competency traps (Leonard-Barton, 1992) . Empirical evidence supports the likelihood of failure when a new technology is competence-destroying (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) or when technological change destroys the value a firm's complementary assets (Mitchell, 1989; Tripsas, 1997) .
Still, in some cases the incumbents are the first to embrace and exploit radical innovation.
They do so, even though they are facing a competence-destroying technological change and even though they cannot just replicate the capabilities of a new entrant (Henderson, 1993) . The activities that lead to top management's decision to embrace an innovation can be viewed as a problem-solving process in which the managers collect and evaluate information in order to recognize the potential of the innovation and rationale behind its exploitation (Galbraith, 1973; Roberts, 1988) . Cognitive representations are typically based on historical experience (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982) . Senior managers work together over time and develop a set of beliefs, or 'dominant logic' for the firm (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) . These beliefs include a shared sense of who the relevant competitors are (Reger and Huff, 1994; Porac et al., 1995; Peteraf and Shanley, 1997; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) . In rapidly changing environments top managers often have difficulty adapting their mental models, resulting in poor organizational performance in the face of technological change (Barr, Stimpert, and Huff, 1992; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998) . Some succeed in doing so; some contributions have suggested that "ambidextrous organizations" O'Reilly, 1996, Tushman, Anderson and O'Reilly, 1997 ) have a higher propensity to successfully cope with both incremental and radical innovation simultaneously.
To compete in the face of technological change, firms must create portfolios of innovation that extend their existing technical trajectory and/or move into different markets (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1997) ; firms must create innovation streams. Innovation streams are patterns of innovations that simultaneously build on and extend prior products and destroy those very products that account for a firm's historical success (Tushman, Anderson and O'Reilly, 1996) . Innovations streams shape and reshape markets.
Innovation streams are unique to a firm and its history. For a particular firm, innovations streams differ from one another based on their technical departure from existing products and/or departure from existing markets (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1997) . Various research traditions have investigated the successful management of innovation streams. In the following sections we discuss how research on technological discontinuities and dominant designs; dynamic capabilities; organizational change and organizational forms provides insight for managing innovation streams.
Innovation streams, technological discontinuities and dominant designs
Patterns of technological innovation and determinants of their success have drawn the attention of management researchers since this problem area emerged as a research domain (Schmookler, 1966; Marquis, 1969) . Technological evolution is often framed by the idea of technology cycles, a concept borrowed from ecological theory (Tushman and Murmann, 1998) .
Technology cycles are composed of technological discontinuities that trigger periods of technological and competitive ferment. These turbulent innovation periods end with the emergence of an industry standard or dominant design (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994) . Dominant designs emerge out of competition between alternative technological trajectories initiated and pushed by competitors, alliance groups, and government regulators, each with their own political, social and economic agenda (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992) . The dominant design is perceived as "selected" to the degree that it is the design that is able to survive the competition for resources. Dominant designs are watershed events in a technological cycle. Where before the dominant design is driven by competition between alternative trajectories, after the dominant design emerges subsequent technological change is driven by the logic of the selected technology itself. It shifts product innovation from major product variation to major process innovation and, in turn, to incremental innovation. The emergence of a dominant design ushers in a period of incremental as well as architectural technological change (Utterback, 1978; Henderson and Clark, 1990) .
The premise about the synchronicity of innovation and market development has been supported by industrial economists (e.g., Muller, 1969; Jenkins, 1975; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994; Klepper, 1996) and the management of technological innovation (e.g., Foster, 1986; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992) . The marketing literature (Weitz and Wensley, 1988; Urban and Star, 1991) and operations management literature (Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark, 1988) accept, relate and build upon these principles.
At some time, the current dominant design is broken by the next substitute design that sets off the next wave of variation, selection and retention (Tushman et al., 1997) . The new designs generally employ widely different architectures, configurations, and features. They open up various trajectories along which technological evolution can take place. Industries co-evolve with the dominant designs (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Van de Ven and Garud, 1994) . The cycles of variation, selection and retention are not discrete events, but consist of several interacting processes that 'co-produce' or 'social create' each other (Latour, 1987; Van de Ven and Garud, 1994) . Dominant designs and technological discontinuities are not technically determined; rather, they are windows of competitive opportunity where managerial action can shape market rules and subsequent innovation patterns (e.g., Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Utterback, 1994) .
The emergence of a new dominant design in a product class normally means adaptation or extinction; dominant designs destroy existing incremental innovation patterns and threaten to render existing capabilities valueless. If a firm does not adapt to the new dominant design, it may find itself locked-out of the market (Schilling, 1998) . Often however, even after competitors decide to adapt their designs to the dominant design, they are not able to manufacture products based on the new design efficiently enough, and thus cannot sustain themselves for long. Both, multiple case studies (Christensen, 1993 ) and studies at the population level (Baum, Korn, Kotha, 1995) have shown that many firms disappear from the competitive arena when a new design emerges. Firms cannot wait for the dominant design to emerge, they have to participate at the "industry creation" and become proponents of technological discontinuities. Firms need to embrace radical innovation before they become locked-out of the market.
Consequently, firm's ability to proactively initiate incremental, architectural, as well as discontinuous innovation is at the roots of maintaining sustained competitive advantage.
Management must develop the diverse competencies and organizational capabilities to shape and take advantage of dominant designs.
Innovation streams and dynamic capabilities
Dynamic capabilities allow firms to change (Teece et al., 1997 , Pisano 1994 , Grant, 1996 , Henderson and Cockburn, 1994 , Eisenhardt and Martin 2000 . They enable firms to build new products and new capabilities. Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) provided the concept of dynamic capabilities and stressed the importance of further theoretical and empirical work to help understand "how firms get to be good, why and how they improve and why they sometimes decline". Dynamic capabilities are build on the dispersed development of specialized knowledge of different kinds, as a product of individual and collective learning (e.g., Leonard-Barton, 1992; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Nonaka, 1994) . They are evoked through the integration of specialized knowledge into strategic initiatives or product development projects (e.g., Burgelman, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996) . They draw on firm resources and competences as key factors in understanding continuous innovation (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Verona, 1999) . They require a periodic reconfiguration of the patterns of combined knowledge that form the essence of products and strategies (Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Hargadon and Sutton, 1998) . Thus, dynamic capabilities are anchored in a firm's ability to exploit through incremental innovation and explore through non-incremental innovation (March, 1991; McGrath, 1999) . They are the drivers behind the creation, evolution, and recombination of resources into new sources of competitive advantage (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Teece et al., 1997) . They are the strategic process that centers on routines to realign the match-up of businesses and their related resources to changing market opportunities (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999) .
Effective patterns of dynamic capabilities vary depending on the market dynamism (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) . In markets with stable industry structures, clear boundaries, and well-known players, managers can develop efficient processes that are predictable and relatively stable with linear steps (Helfat, 1997) . The organizational architectures, structures, roles, cultures, and processes can rely on the enhancement and refinement of the existing knowledge base. Tacit knowledge can be codified into detailed routines that precisely specify steps and subdivide activities among different individuals. Studies from the paint industry (Frederickson, 1984) , chemical industry (Pisano, 1994) , and mainframe computer industry (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995) evidence the contribution of incremental knowledge enhancement to effective strategic decision making or new product development processes. While an organization's average level of skill and competences in its activities increases with repetition and tighter coordination of activities, variation in resulting outcomes decreases (Levitt and March, 1988; Levinthal, 1991) . Further, as the capabilities linked to those activities extend further into an organization through tighter linkages between organization wide processes or through direct influence on product development processes, exploitative technological innovations are increasingly likely and anything more than incremental innovation and change is difficult (Sull, Tedlow, and Rosenbloom, 1997) .
In contrast, strategic innovation in periods of discontinuous change requires fundamentally different dynamic capabilities. In these situations, capabilities necessarily rely much less on existing knowledge and much more on rapidly creating situation-specific new knowledge, involving actions that create rapid learning through small losses and immediate feedback (Sitkin, 1992) . They proceed through iterative processes, rely on real-time information, and are characterized by parallel consideration and often partial implementation of multiple options (Eisenhardt, 1989) .
While tightly linked processes allow for more efficiency in continuing activities that are similar to past activities, they also make non-incremental innovations and changes difficult, as change in one part of the system requires a cascade of changes elsewhere (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) . Research has found that dynamic capabilities in highvelocity markets faced with ever evolving, discontinuous change are linked to semi-structures, links through time and sequenced steps (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) . In short, companies have to build different organizational architectures, structures, roles, cultures, and processes according to the competitive contexts which require a firm to be efficient and/or innovative, to explore as well as to exploit (March, 1991; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1997) . Ambidextrous organizational architectures build dynamic capabilities through variation generated in exploratory units and through consistency and control managed in exploitative units (Tushman et al, 2002) . Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine (1999), Nonaka (1988) , and Bradach (1998) provide evidence of dynamic capabilities in the automotive and restaurant franchise business through ambidextrous organizational designs.
The capability to change is critical for the firm in order to sustain its competitive advantage in the current dramatically shifting competitive environments (Nelson and Winter, 1992; Grant, 1996; Teece et al. 1997; Henderson and Clark, 1990) . Consequently, the most recent work on the resource based view of the firm has focused on the connection between capabilities and change (Iansiti and Clark, 1992; Martin, 2000, Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000) .
Innovation streams, organizational change and the ambidextrous organizational form
Organizational renewal involves the building and expansion of organizational competencies over time through new product development, often involving a change in the organization's structure and culture (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Floyd and Lane, 2000) . According to Floyd and Lane, 'a theory of strategic renewal must recognize that maintaining adaptiveness requires both exploiting existing competencies and exploring new ones ' (2000, 155) . A firm's administrative context powerfully shapes resource allocation. In this sense, the firm can be viewed as a selection environment (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983) . Innovation within firms occurs through processes that are autonomous and emergent even as they are shaped through processes that are strategically induced by top management (Burgelman, 1983; Mintzberg, 1978; Noda and Bower, 1996) . Many firms become increasingly able to recognize disruptive innovations emerging in the marketplace and are committing substantial resources to a venture designed at developing and commercialising disruptive innovations. Despite the substantial financial and human resources, energies invariably focus on the old business model and the traditional resource base (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) .
Framing of strategic issues is key concern in management and organizational change research (Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret, 1976; Nutt, 1984; Dutton, 1992; Kahneman and Tversky, 1983) . Despite the inherent appeal, the simultaneous manipulation of frames is extremely difficult. Cognitive psychology points out that frames tend to perpetuate themselves (Rosch, 1975; Cantor and Mischel, 1977) . Interpretative theory shows that the initial interpretation of organizational meaning shapes the future interpretation through a process similar to the encoding process described in schema theory (Daft and Weick, 1984; Weick, 1995) .
Moreover, resource allocation is an iterative process (Noda and Bower, 1996) . Research on discontinuous innovation suggests that creating a separate organization helps the venture to avoid the traps of resource allocation (Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Bower, 1996) . Separation allows also for the de-coupling of competitive managerial mind-set (Gilbert, 2002) .
A firm's prior history constrains its future behaviour in that learning tends to be premised on local processes of search (March and Simon, 1958; Levitt and March, 1988; Teece, 1988) .
When learning needs to be distant, and radically new capabilities need to be developed, firms often fall into competency traps, as core competences become 'core rigidities' (Leonard-Barton, 1992 ). Since managers have bounded rationality, they rely on simplified representations of the world in order to process information (Simon, 1955) . Cognitive representations are typically based on historical experience as opposed to current knowledge of the environment (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982) . The social psychology literature examines the role of cognitive frames on behavior. Experimental research has shown how different decision frames can end in different behavior around otherwise identical alternatives (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984) .
The behavioural pattern associated with framing combine to produce the replication of individual, group, and firm's usual response. In many crisis or renewal situation this proves to be the appropriate response. Refocusing on what you do best, returning to your most successful processes may help to resolve the crisis (Hurst, 1995; Kotter, 1996) . However, if the competitive environment undergoes fundamental changes, responding in the usual processes and patterns intensifies dysfunctional behaviour (Staw, Sandelands and Dutton, 1981) . Research has suggested that separating a new business plays an important role in creating new capabilities and routines (Christensen, 1997; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Tushman and O'Reilly, 1997) .
"Ambidextrous organizations" try to overcome the threat of those rigidities and to enhance the creation of new capabilities through high levels of structural differentiation, targeted structural integration, as well as high level of senior team organization O'Reilly, 1996, Tushman, Anderson and O'Reilly, 1997; Tushman et al., 2002) .
Ambidextrous organizations simultaneously operate in multiple time frames as they exploit and explore at the same time (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1997; Bagahi, Coley and White, 1999) ; ambidextrous organizational forms do not switch between exploration and exploitationthey do both simultaneously. They are composed of fundamentally different subunits some of which are tightly structures while others are loosely structured. These internally inconsistent architectures are physically, culturally and structurally distinct from each other. Ambidextrous organizational forms are composed of multiple integrated architectures that are themselves inconsistent with each other (Bradach; Sutcliffe, Sitkin, and Browning, Tushman and O'Reilly, 1997) . Ambidextrous designs are defined by high differentiation and limited tactical integration.
Ambidextrous designs achieve strategic linkages through the senior team (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1997; Bradach, 1998) . The general manager and the senior team drive both induced and autonomous strategic action. Ambidextrous designs permit senior teams to simultaneously explore through experimentation as well as to exploit through rigorous processes. The senior team can build processes capable of dealing with the conflicts and trade-offs associated with operating in multiple time frames (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Sutton, 2002) . This is done to pursue exploitation and exploration concurrently. The organizational characteristics required for an effective exploitative innovation are fundamentally different than those characteristics required for an effective exploratory innovation (March, 1991) . In the short run managers must increase the fit or alignment of strategy, structure, and culture. In the long run, they are required to destroy the very alignment that has made their organizations successful.
Exploitation requires tight controls, structures, culture, and disciplined processes, exploration asks for looser controls, structures, and more flexible processes (Quinn and Cameron, 1988; Burgelman, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992) . The contrasting demands requires managers periodically to destroy what has been created in order to reconstruct a new organization better suited for the next wave of competition and technology (Burgelman, 1991; Eisenhard and Tabrizi, 1995; Morone, 1993; Hurst, 1995; Leonard-Barton, 1995) . Each cell in a firm's innovation space is associated with different task and environmental contingencies, and as such, requires its own set of structures, incentives, culture and competencies (Sutcliffe, Sitkin, and Browning, 2000; Bradach, 1997; Nadler and Tushman, 1997) .
While change in strategy and structure can seem easier to implement, change in the way firm actually functions based on its values and the deep structure of its culture is more difficult (Nelson, 1992; Leonard-Barton, 1992) . Culture has been considered an essential component in strategic processes (e.g., Barney, 1986) . Incentive systems which modify culture have been identified as an important constituent to spur new product development (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Iansiti and Clark, 1994) . Some scholars have seen the roots of firms' rigidities in the cultures and routines that historically had led to their success (Maidique and Zirger, 1984; Schein, 1988; Leonard-Barton, 1992 ).
In sum, several traditions of research contribute insights to the way firms try and often fail to manage streams of innovation. Moreover, researchers recognize that large multiple market and multiple technology organizations need to address simultaneously different types of innovation which require conflicting organizational configurations in order to compete successfully.
METHOD Settings
We chose as a setting a company in the computer industry, namely IBM. The industry has been extensively used both in studies of continuous and incremental innovation and in studies of radical change (Utterback, 1994; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1996; Tidd et al., 2000) . The two projects in the company were selected as cases based on the logic of theoretical sampling (Glaser and Straus, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989) . First, the simultaneous successful incremental and successful radical innovation in one firm can extend the existing theory on organizations facing the opposing pressures of two types of innovations. Second, as examples of polar types of innovation, the two cases provide the opportunity to analyze a quasi-experiment in the real context of a field study where only the variable of interest, incremental versus radical innovation varies (Yin, 1994) .
Another important approach in the selection of settings was the decision to make the choice of the cases of incremental and radical innovation as defined by the company. The managers described the projects as incremental and radical innovation. Thus, we argue, we avoid the definitional problem of what extend of novelty can be defined as radical and stress the importance of the managerial perceptions of the type of change in initiating and implementing specific organizational changes in response to it (Starbuck and Mezias, 1996; Tidd et al., 2000) .
The project of incremental innovation aimed at minimizing the personal interactions between employees in the Human Resources department and the other employees in the company while maintaining the high level of the quality of the Human Resource (HR) services. The project lasted for 1 year. The new mode of delivery of the HR services relied on change of processes and the use of the Internet technologies. While, before the change, the main logic of the services of the HR department was "Full Employment", now the company offered "Full Employability". The project included three types of changes. Firstly, there was a change of the current HR services in terms of developing added-value through consulting, development and internationalization of the HR functions. Secondly, the processes for providing the HR services were changed through focusing on the core processes, reduction of the headcount, centralization and outsourcing.
Thirdly, the project introduced the use of new technology in the service delivery: mobile computing; ERP; e-business technologies. As a result of the project, there were major changes in the organizational structure with regard to the processes of HR services delivery, which became globally centralized, followed different procedures and were regarded as 'customer-oriented'. In fact, the managers used in the interviews the term of "reengineering of the processes" which literature links to radical change (Hamel and Champy, 1990) . However, according to the managers the main goal of the changes was a continuous change that would reduce the costs of HR services and improve the incrementally the quality of current services. For this reason they defined the project as incremental innovation. As a result of the project the costs were reduced by 57%, the headcount of HR department diminished by 65% and the customer satisfaction of the employees doubled to reach 90%. Thus, the project was defined by the managers of the company as a successful incremental innovation.
In a response to discontinuity in the market, the project of radical innovation aimed at the development of E-business hosting centers (Web-hosting), which provided radically new services to new external clients. The project lasted for one year and six months and took place at the same time as the project of incremental innovation and in the same country. Without this major investment, IBM perceived to run the risk of being locked out of a market with a huge future potential. However, at the time of the project initiation and implementation, the main clients of the new service was a niche of small and medium sized firms. The typical large clients of IBM was not targeted because of the high costs of the use of the Centre related to redundance of their own IT structures. Therefore, IBM had to develop new commercialization capabilities and processes to address the new customers and upgrade the offering to the expectations and needs of the current customers parallel to the development of new technological capabilities and processes fundamental to the radically new service. From the beginning on, it was envisioned that the large firms will be attracted to the value-adding benefits of the new services and this was incorporated in the business plan. Since the project was defined by managers as a radical change and to gain access to complementary assets and capabilities, the project was implemented by means of a separate organizational structure in joint venture with large telecommunication company.
According to the managers of the project, the development and implementation of the Web Hosting service was successful and it achieved its objectives brilliantly.
To summarize, we investigate two successful simultaneous cases of innovation which are polar types: an incremental and a radical innovation, as defined by the managers of the company.
We have the opportunity to study how managers simultaneously address incremental and radical innovations which according to theories on ambidextrous organizations and on innovation succeed by means of different and conflicting organizational designs.
Research Design
We conducted a field study of two cases in one organization following the logic of extended case method (Burawoy, 1991; Locke, 1996; Vaugan, 1992) . In contrast to grounded theory building (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) , the goal of the methodology is not to build a new theory, but to integrate streams of literature relevant to a problem area and to employ the empirical data of in-depth case studies to fill the gaps, elaborate its meaning and reveal its flaws.
We chose the extended case method, because our interest in exploring the dynamics of a complex context driven phenomenon, the managing of ambidextrous organizations. Moreover, for this research question the integration of several literatures and research streams could provide added value. The extended case study method consists of iterative comparison and exchanges between literature analysis, data analysis and data collection. 'Two running exchanges ' (Buroway, 1991) are carried out: between literature review and data analysis, and between data analysis and data collection. During the first exchange, we used review of literature to determine the relevant conceptual frameworks to aid the data analysis. At the same time the interpretation of data pointed to the importance of new concepts and theories. The second run of exchange consisted of a continuous iterative collecting and interpretation of data till theoretical saturation was reached.
Previous theories helped to select the cases, to sensitize the researcher and were used during the data collection and analysis phase in the development of the categories. As Pettigrew (1988) noted, given the limited number of cases, which can be studied, it makes sense to choose extreme or polar situations in which the phenomenon of interest is more easily observable. We selected two successful cases of innovation, which were defined by managers as an incremental and a radical innovation. Thus, we could explore how managers used structure and culture as the main instruments of 'hardware' and 'software' of organizational architecture to manager different types of innovation.
Data Collection
We collected data using as sources interviews, internal presentations of the projects, archival information and observations. The triangulation made possible by multiple sources of evidence and different research methods increases the internal validity and provides stronger basis for the definition of emerging constructs and relationships (Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989) .
1)
Interviews: In a first phase we conducted semi-structured interviews to identify the cases and develop an overall understanding of the approaches to managing innovation in the organization. The 2-hour interviews with six key informants were followed by further contacts during the data analysis process. The rich qualitative data of the interviews described the projects in general and specific experiences of managers during different phases of the projects. During interviews we asked probing questions to encourage the interviewees to refer to specific events and to give examples. We examined the interviews and literature review to develop initial categories on the differences between the structural and cultural characteristics of the projects and in the way managers tried to influence structure and culture in the two types of innovation. On the basis of these categories we developed questionnaires and gathered quantitative data from 50 members of the organization ranging from CEOs and project managers to IT specialists and human resource management employees (see Table 1 ). All of our informants were involved in the two projects under study. Internal presentations of the projects: We had access to all documents on presentations of the projects and did observations on internal presentations of the projects. The presentations of projects explicitly focused on the goals of the projects, the process and products, which had to be changed during the projects, the managerial tools to be applied, the implications for everyday activities and the current results of the project.
3) Observations:
We could attend 4 presentations of the projects and 3 meetings where the projects and their results were discussed. Several informal conversations allowed us to clarify the observed problems and interactions.
4)
Archival information: We gathered secondary data on-side and from the media to build an understanding on some of the categories as 'external visibility' of the innovative efforts and to complement and validate information on the outcomes of the project and on the characteristics of the projects.
Data Analysis
As typical in field research, we analyzed the data by building both individual cases and by comparing categories and patterns across cases (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser, 1992) . The data was coded and several first tentative categories emerged on the basis of comparing this data with data from the participant observation, archival data and theory. Such first categories were, for example, 'quasi-separation from the old structure' or 'destruction of new capabilities by diffusion'. Using the transcripts of the interviews, the database from the qualitative interviews and the documents we distinguished the features of organizational structure and culture of the two empirical cases and compared them with the theoretical concepts. Each researcher developed an emergent case story, independent from the other. Our interpretation of the divergence between theory and empirical data converged in 80 % of the analysis. A major issue for discussion was the interpretation of the approach of managers to defining the type of innovation in terms of radical and incremental. We eventually included both interpretations in our findings. Then, we went back to the data and checked for the underlying mechanisms for the detected gaps and differences between theory and practice.
We used both qualitative and quantitative data to improve the quality of our findings (Eisenhardt, 1989) . While the qualitative data allowed us to understand how managers approached the different kinds of change, the quantitative data provided us with the shared understanding of managers and members of the project teams on the actual features of the culture and structure which characterised the each project.
For the analysis of qualitative data, we created tables with quotes which reflect the main categories. Table 1 represents an example of the approach. 
Summary of data on categories

FINDINGS
The findings in this section emerge from the interplay of literature on innovation and organizational change and the analysis of data. In attempting to understand the differences between the findings and theoretical frameworks, we looked at, firstly, how managers define and approach types of innovation, then, at the characteristics of organizational architecture, structure and culture, during the incremental innovation and during the radical innovation and, finally, at the unexpected dysfunctional effects of the radical innovation approach. We discuss these three areas of interest in the following three subsections.
Approaching innovation
Previous research identifies several different types of innovation with regard to what is
changed and what is the degree of novelty (Tidd, et al, 2001) . Major classification in literature are incremental and radical (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) , product and process (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) . The fact that a case of innovation has several of these characteristics leads to the use of matrices to pinpoint the exact nature of a specific phenomenon.
In contrast, managers in the analyzed cases defined incremental and radical innovation across single dimension: degree of change of product, without taking into consideration the degree of change of processes (see Figure 1) . Moreover, they applied standard hardware tools based on management fads (Abrahamson, 2000) for the specific type of innovation, although the cultural and human factor was a common concern. The application of the tools were based on the narrowness of the definition of the type of project as a degree of change of product. We identified tow basic categories for the approach of managers to innovation: 'process blindness' and 'standard tools for change'.
Process blindness:
The project of incremental change was identified by the managers of the organization as incremental change, because it aimed at the application of internet and intranet at the human resource management function. The goal of the project was, according to the organizational members, only to minimize the interactions of human resource employees with the rest of the organization while maintaining the same level of quality of service and client satisfaction. As an interviewee put it:
"Recapitulating from the point of view of the user, the employees and the managers will refer to intranet to get the services they need; when more complex problems arise, the employees and managers can get in touch with the unique Service centre for the whole company."
Although managers discussed the product change in terms of incremental change with regard to the costs of human resources and switching from personal service to self service, they elaborated presentations and lead discussions about changes in processes which had the characteristics of radical change (see Figure 1) . They used the term "process reengineering"
which by definition refers exactly to radical change of processes (Hammer and Champy, 1993) , changed the formal organizational structure with regard to the delivery of human resource services and referred to changes of "all aspects of the functioning of the human resource The first project was defined as incremental and required radical changes in the business processes. The second project, defined as radical innovation, required radical change both in products and in processes, but was approached and managed as a case of an incremental change in processes. The focus on the radical change of products seemed to divert the attention of the managers from the need for a radical change in processes and lead to only incremental process innovation (see Figure 1 ).
The managers recognized implicitly the radical nature of the impact of the product innovation on organizational processes for the introduction of Web Hosting services:
"IBM has always distinguished itself for knowing how to approach a small number of large customers with many problems. In contrast, with the service of e-business on demand, the firm had to approach many and small clients and to satisfy their needs for a pre-packaged offer in
Product Process
Incremental Radical Yes
Yes a market where 'time-to-market' is essential." As a consequence, the new business was separated in an independent organizational unit, which, however, continues to interact closely with the old organization in two ways. First, some of the resource for the project do not move to the new structure, but are only 'fenced' and remain in their old departments. Second, in order to avoid redundance, the new unit had to interact intensively with the group for software and hardware development, for acquisition and management of hardware and software and administrative departments. Moreover, members of the old organizations were encouraged to participate in training and workshops in the new unit, in order to also 'develop the new competencies'. Thus, the new organization unit could not develop internal organizational mechanisms which were separate and independent from the old organization. These managerial decisions and the preference of clients of the new unit for 'integrated' service increased the embeddedness of the new organizational structure in traditional processes and procedures from the old organizational units and handicapped the development of new organizational processes.
Automatic attribution: Following the definition of the type of innovation according one dimension, degree of novelty of product, managers applied automatically standard tools for managing the change. They referred to the seemingly appropriate 'change management' concepts and explained the procedures of change in terms of "as we always do this". With regard to incremental innovation, a manager commented:
"The strategy applied here every time when we have to make incremental changes to allow the firm to evolve gradually is: analysis, definition, transformation, construction, implementation and improvement."
Thus, incremental change was approached by intervention, in-side innovation and typical tools of organizational development.
On the other hand, radical change was developed "always" in a separate structure. It started, for example with a phase "change readiness assessment", conducted in two focus groups according to change management tools such as "pyramid of resistance". The tools used in this type of innovation were also based on automatic intervention based on the type of product innovation and standard structural approaches.
Managing contradicting organizational architectures
Previous research develops the concept of ambidextrous organizations, whose dual organizational structure and culture incorporate both the experimentation, improvisation and luck, typical for small organizations, and the efficiency, standardization and consistency associated with larger organizations (Tushman et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Imai et al., 1985) . These organizations, which succeed in both incremental and radical innovation, have to concurrently nurture these contradicting requirements. In contrast, our analysis of the empirical data suggests that successful incremental innovation and successful radical innovation are not managed with the appropriate organizational architecture. Moreover, we found that multiple contradictory cultures and structures did not co-exist in the organization, but the deep structures and cultures remain the same for the two types of innovation projects.
Matching structure and culture for incremental innovation: We identified the required characteristics of the organizational architecture during a project of incremental innovation based on the qualitative interview with managers and the literature review. The questionnaire on those characteristics provided quantitative data, which seems to contradict the espoused theories on the characteristics of successful incremental innovations (see Table 2 ). Especially the variables "managing the present" and "stimulation of experimenting" were found to be irrelevant to the process of managing incremental change. Other variables as "information sharing", "empowerment" and "managing of the social relationships" had a considerable variation of the responses. The variables with strongest relevance on the management of incremental change were managing within the old organization with 'standardization of processes', using existing 'competences' and changing within a short period. The results of the quantitative analysis were corroborated by the statements of the managers on the importance of top down structural and cultural change and on the whole approach of the organization to culture and change. A manager discussed the key factors of success of incremental innovation as repeated communication, choice of the right moment, using the experience and support of the managers to guide the change and guarantee of the speed of change through eliminating the old system. The employees are considered as the main factor of resistance and problems of change. As a manager explained:
"Man by nature is opposed to change and, for this reason, the human resources are the aspect of organization, which is most complicated to be changed… As in any process of organizational change, the phase of facing the reality and the expectations is most critical. The resistances have been overcome easily with the use of mechanisms, the speed of change, to eliminate the old method and push the people to the novelty and with communication."
In sum, in both cases the project leaders applied only the structural intervention mechanisms at their disposal. Cultural aspects, though featured highly in their espoused theories of change management were hardly addressed.
Matching the culture and structure for radical change: We investigated the organizational architecture for radical innovation on the basis of the qualitative data and the quantitative data on critical organizational characteristics. Although the organization developed a separate organizational unit in joint venture with another company, both kinds of data suggested that the new unit was only 'quasi-independent', because it shared resources and procedures with the old structure. The rationale for the close relationships was the expected reintegration of the new unit.
One of the managers commented:
"From a tactical point of view, the creating of a separate unit was a necessity to build from zero a new business with regard to competences and infrastructure in a restricted period of six months. We decided to separate the two structures with the goal, however, to reintegrate them in less than one year and a half, in order to avoid that the vertical splitting in the delivery transforms itself into antagonism between teams."
Other rationales for the strong interdependence between the two structures, provided in the interviews, were the need to avoid redundancy in the staffing and the need of customers to get access to integrated solutions. Thus, the new unit remained structurally intertwined with the old organization.
Moreover, the culture of the new organizational unit did not differ from that of the old organization (see Table 3 Gilbert and Bower (2002) argue that instead of maintaining the new organization and the old organizations separate, managers must reintegrate the new structure in the old one when the old business becomes obsolete and the survival of the old organization is threatened. However, our study indicated that the reintegration of the new unit has strong dysfunctional effects. The new individual skills were transferred in the old organization, but new organizational capabilities embedded in the routines of the new unit were destroyed unintentionally in a way which we termed as 'capability mutations'. Thus, the organization did profit from the full potential it developed during the innovation project because of capability mutations.
Bringing outside innovation in
Capability mutations:
The managers of the new organization have been assigned key positions in the new organization, but at the same time they had to work with a group of "mixed" employees from old unit and the new unit. The mixing of staff from the two structures was expected to speed up and improve the integration of the two previously competitive structures. A project manager from the new unit explained the problems of the approach:
"The reintegration was dramatic no because we had a new boss, but because of the considerable dispersion and disorganization we suffered in the traditional unit, which is much bigger. Before, when the unit was small, the project manager could choose and allocate the resources with the goals to realize a good project; now, the project managers have to ask the managers of the system administrators and often cannot get the resources they want. Conflicts are generated, which are typical for the structure that manages projects internal to a large organization."
This approach to integration created new limited groups, which had members from both organizational units, and made them work together for one or two months. Thus, the exchange of knowledge and setting of common standards, without interventions from above, had to take place. However, the groups and processes of the new structure were destroyed and new capabilities had to be built in order to address the same clients. The company had to initiate a new "real" project for organizational change and integration of the employees and the managers.
An interviewee commented:
"It is clear that solutions of this kind will require more time. Now, there is a new project in course, which is no more technological, but on the organizational and human level, which have to make people who work for the same client but in different areas together putting them in the same team with the same manager."
To summarize, the reintegration lead to destruction of developed organizational competences and to the necessity for re-investment in new competence building efforts. Thus, the company did not profit from the advantage in terms of new process development resulting from managing innovation outside.
DISCUSSION
This paper explores how organizations manage simultaneously incremental and radical change. In particular, we attempted to understand how managers approach different types of innovation and whether and how they use different organizational architectures to manage them.
Our work ties closely on literature on innovation, organizational capabilities and organizational change and extends theorizing on ambidextrous in the following directions.
Our analysis of the way managers approach innovation introduces new insights on the cognitive limits of managers in innovation and on problems of changing organizational capabilities. First, the data on 'process blindness' suggests that managers are cognitively limited not only by their cognitive structures based on past experience (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) , but also by other types of cognitive limitations. Managers in the studied cases use simple heuristics in managing the complex and highly uncertain problems of innovation. They apply very narrow set of criteria, limiting their decision criteria to type of product innovation. They do not consider the degree of novelty of processes or the other relevant. Thus, the problems of framing and cognitive biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Hodgkinson, 2001; Maule and Hodgkinson, 2002 ) are likely to be salient in decision-making on innovation. Second, managers in our cases attribute automatically standard tools to new innovation projects. The approach to innovation seems to be rule-guided, routine and repetitive and based on previous successes. When trying to build new capabilities in order to avoid the 'competence trap' (Levitt and March, 1988; Levinthal and March, 1993) , they limit themselves to the 'second-order capabilities' (Collis, 1994) in which they have become specialized and do not explore new approaches. Thus, they are inhibited by what we would name 'second-order competence trap' of applying second-order competences which are not appropriate for the change process: accumulated knowledge on how to change capabilities inhibits the use of innovative ways of change.
Further extension of literature on innovation and insights on organizational change may result from our analysis on the way companies use the assumed multiple organizational architectures to manage different types of innovation. Organizations need to manage incremental and radical change simultaneously. Originally, according to the theory on ambidextrous organizations, successful innovators have dual organizational architectures and manage contradicting structures and cultures (Tushman et al., 1997) . In a recent empirical study on ambidextrous organizations, Tushman, Smith, Wood, Westerman, and O'Reilly (2002) redefined ambidextrous organizations focusing only on the structural aspects of the organizational architecture by non-incremental innovation: innovation in a unit with high structural differentiation, low levels of structural integration, and a strong senior team. They found that the ambidextrous organizations have common characteristics with regard to culture: the differentiated unit for non-incremental innovation has a different culture. In contrast, we found that in our cases of successful innovation the organizational architecture was the same with regard to culture in both incremental and non-incremental cases of innovation. It differed mainly with regard to one characteristic of structure: the location of innovation in a separate unit, which is integrated through senior management. Even the incentive system of the unit in our case of radical innovation was not considered to match the objectives of the project by the low-level interviewees. It seems that organizations separate non-incremental innovations in a different unit, but other characteristics of structure and culture remain the same during incremental and nonincremental innovation. One possible explanation for the conflicting findings may be the choice of research design. In their study they compare the characteristics only of the non-incremental innovation projects across several business units. In contrast, we compared the organizational architectures of one business unit with regard to an incremental and a non-incremental project.
We argue that concept of ambidextrous organizations, which have multiple structures and cultures, does not seem to correspond to the empirical data. We discovered a single organizational architecture, which was intentionally modified through interventions in the structure to facilitate innovation. The notion of dual organizations may even be dangerous because it can imply that the repertoire of organizational cultures and structures is always there available when necessity arises or is the same for each incremental or radical innovation.
We identified a considerable gap between company's theorizing on change management and the inner working of how change projects are implemented. The company, we studied, develops strong research in the area of change management in a centre with other market leaders.
However, the high level of the espoused theories of managers (Argyris, 1999) corresponded to one-sided and limited theories-in-action. In both cases, project leaders applied only the structural tools for change (Tushman et al., 1997) . Cultural aspects were considered only superficially.
Thus, we identified the presence of a strong bias towards a limited use of the 'hardware' of organizational architecture in managing innovation projects.
The investigation of the reintegration efforts for bringing-in outside innovation suggests a final link to extant theories on innovation and organizational capabilities. Gilbert and Bower (2002) caution against a too fast reintegration and discuss a modular integration approach. We further elaborate the warning through our study of the unintentional capability mutations, which resulted from the reintegration. The joint working of the old unit and new unit in order to provide integrated solutions for customers was indispensable and seemed to require integration, but the way the two units were integrated caused the destruction of new capabilities embedded in the ways of working of the new unit. Old structures and dispersion of individual skills inhibited replication of new ways of working. So, the stress in managing reintegration should shift from what activities to reintegrate to how to reintegrate them and can use the insights on management of mergers and acquisitions to improve the integration processes.
To summarize, our findings allowed to address and uncover some gaps in the understanding of how managers apply organization design instruments to manage simultaneously different types of innovation.
CONCLUSION
Innovation research has become locked in the separation of the study of incremental innovation from that of radical innovation. We questioned the way managers address simultaneously the conflicting requirements posed on organizational design by incremental and radical innovation. The concept of ambidextrous organizations (Tushman et al., 1997 ) provided a useful starting point for our endeavour. Organizations which are active simultaneously in multiple markets with multiple technologies and customers seem to need to generate simultaneously multiple types of innovation. We expand the investigation on the characteristics of organizations which try to manage both incremental and radical innovation simultaneously through an in-depth study and comparison of the organizational architectures for the different types of innovation projects.
The presented findings are based on an in-depth study of two projects in one firm.
Idiosyncratic characteristics of the firm and the project could have impacted the data and do not allow statistical generalization. Future research is needed to determine if the results apply to other contexts. Additional field studies and theoretical generalization through replication shall refine the insights and improve the external validity of the research results (Yin, 1994) . Further research should also study the phenomenon through other research methods in order to complement the rich insights on one organization and to allow for triangulation.
Our results suggested that both incremental and radical innovation involved process blindness, rule-guided responses in the approach to innovation and unintended capability mutations. The use of same organizational architecture with an actual matching of organizational design to the type of innovation, limited to the location of the project, contradicted the assumptions on functioning of ambidextrous organizations. Thus, successful innovations did not seem to follow the expected logic of change. A paradox of the ambidextrous organization emerges and challenges the researchers to look for different success factors in management of innovation.
